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Henry Kissinger Secretary of the State during the war
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Ismail Fahmi Acting Egyptian Foreign Minster during the war
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Golda Meir Prime Minster of Israel during the war.
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Nixon The American President
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Sadat The Egyptian President

The October War and U.S. Policy

After thirty years, U.S.A. declassified very secret documents about 6 October war and these documents were organized chronologically and published by The National Security Archive - George Washington University on the net http://www.gwu.edu . And here some of the highlights of the declassified archival record from the website and the other highlights from the point of view of  Yom Kippur website.

May 20, 1973. Before war, Egypt offered peace with Israel

In a meeting between Muhammed Hafez Ismail Egyptian presidential adviser for national security affairs Henry A. Kissinger Assistant to the president for national security affairs.

"Muhammed Hafez Ismail: we have gone to accept to enter into a peace agreement with Israel. This is the first time in almost a quarter of a century that an Arab Head of State takes a decision to be prepared to enter into a peace agreement with Israel..... So if this is not the solution that Egypt wants, what is left for her? to accept status quo? or to go to war?

Henry A. Kissinger: I tried to Explain to you last time what I thought, our recognition of Egyptian sovereignty, and I assured that Israel would violently, totally oppose this part."

Read it all in Document No. 2a

The war started on Saturday, 6 of October 1973

The failure of the intelligence

The failure of U.S. intelligence to perceive the imminent threat of war; according to the State Department's intelligence chief, Ray Cline: "I would like to make one observation about the intelligence. Our difficulty was partly that we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves."

Read it all in Document No. 63

During the War

Arab will lose in 72 hours

Kissinger think that Arab will lose in 72 hours, in a meeting between Ambassador Huang Chen PRG Liaison Office and Henry Kissinger on 6th of October 1973

"Kissinger: The fighting today. For today and tomorrow the Arabs think this is disadvantageous for them. They think it is asking them to give something up. By Tuesday and Wednesday if the war isn't ended, the Arabs will be pleading with us to get this for them, since within 72 to 96 hours the Arabs will be completely defeated. And we have to think of that situation, not of today's situation when they have gained a little territory."

Read it all in Document No. 17

Israel about to lose the war

In a meeting between Simcha Dinitz Ambassador of Israel and Henry Kissinger on 9th of October 1973. Kissinger doesn't believe that Israel about to lose the war and says

"Kissinger: I don't understand how it could happen. Our strategy was to give you until Wednesday evening (10/10/1973) by which time I thought the whole Egyptian army would be wrecked....... we face massive problems. we expected a quick victory. Our whole strategy was to delay until Wednesday."

Read it all in Document No. 21A

The Gap, 17th of October 1973

Admiral Thomas Moorer from JCS says his opinion about The Gap on 17th of October 1973 (I think the canal crossing of those Israeli tanks is nothing more than a raid on the Egyptian air defenses. I don't think they can survive long.)

Read it all in Document No. 36A

Israeli violations of the UN cease-fire

22 October 1973, 1:35 - 2:15 p.m.

Kissinger's virtual green light for Israeli violations of the UN cease-fire and Israel take the advantage to close roads to the Egyptian third army. In a Meeting between Golda Meir Prime Minster of Israel and Kissinger.

"Kissinger: You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens during the night, while I am flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon tomorrow."

Meir: If they don't stop, We won't.

Kissinger: Even if they do...."

Kissinger warns Meir that Israeli forces would collapse, in the same meeting.

"Kissinger: Gromyko (Minster of foreign affairs of USSR) took me aside and said the only danger in Egypt is panic, that your force across the canal isn't very large. This is what they told me. He said that if some steadiness could be produced, maybe your force would collapse.

Meir: They (the Egyptian forces) didn't collapse. But they're in disorder. But it is not like 1967."

Read it all in Document No. 54

Israel close roads to The Egyptian Third Army after cease-fire

Thursday - November 1, 1973, 8:10 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.

In a meeting between Kissinger and Meir

"Kissinger: You took the third army after ceasefire, which was not expected..... It is an unusual situation where an army is trapped after the ceasefire went into effect."

Read it all in Document No. 91A

Egypt insist on October 22 lines before Israeli violations and the final talks which end to a settlement.

Egypt insist that Israel has to return to October 22 lines and open the roads to the third army according to the Security Council Resolutions, In a meeting between Ismail Fahmi Acting Egyptian Foreign Minster and Henry Kissinger.

Thursday - November 1, 1973, 5:30 pm.

"Fahmi: She (Golda Meir) cannot bargain on the return to the October 22 positions. The Security Council has decided the matter......She accepted security council resolutions which called for a return to the October 22 positions... If you cannot give me definite answer, does it mean she refused to return to the October 22 Positions?.. I hope you can settle this whole matter before you come to Egypt. If not, You cannot accomplish anything."

Read it all in Document No. 92A

In a meeting between Ismail Fahmi Acting Egyptian Foreign Minster and Henry Kissinger.

Friday - November 2, 1973, 8:19 p.m.

"Fahmi: I heard what you said regarding Israeli acceptance on October 14 of a ceasefire in place with the United States and the USSR abstaining. The tragedy is now, I don't see why she (Meir) does not return to October 22 positions.

Kissinger: There is no rational explanation.

Fahmi: Do they want a settlement ? They will not be able to stay there. She knows this.

Kissinger: She does not.

Fahmi: How does anyone believe that Sadat (President of Egypt) can go to negotiations if she does not return to the October 22 Position?"

Read it all in Document No. 92B

In a Meeting between Kissinger, Golda Meir The Prime Minster of Israel and Mordechai Gazit, Director of Prime Minster's Office.

Thursday, November 1, 1973. 8:10 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.

"Kissinger: It is just as reasonable for you to go back to the October 22 lines.

Gazit: It may sound naive, But it may be useful to emphasize the importance of the talks going on between the generals.

Kissinger: But if I emphasize it too much, The Egyptians will break them off. I really must tell you you have no appreciation of the situation you face in the country. You may appreciate the battlefield situation

Meir: Then if we appreciate the situation, we must accept everything the Egyptians put to us? It's only the beginning.

Kissinger: No. But you're right, it is only the beginning......You can tell the president (Nixon) you won't accept the October 22 lines. How can you explain why you could accept it on October 22 but not now?"

Read it all in Document No. 91A

In a Meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir The Prime Minster of Israel.

Friday, November 2, 1973.10:00 p.m. - 12:45 a.m.

"Kissinger: Sadat can't make a settlement in which he not only gets nothing on the East Bank but gives up ten kilometers on the West Bank. He'll be overthrown. We have a letter from shah (president of Iran) pleading with us not to go to this. He's not your enemy, and this is what he thinks it means."

Read it all in Document No. 93A

In a Meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir The Prime Minster of Israel.

Saturday, November 3, 1973.

"Meir: The Question of October 22 lines will be discussed between the two sides in the framework of disengagement and separation of forces.

Kissinger: What does that mean?

Meir: It means the generals will touch on it, talk about it.

Kissinger: But if you propose an exchange of armies, What's the significance of the October 22 lines?

Meir: Right. It has none.

Kissinger: you and we are living in a different world. Suppose we make this proposal and they reject it, What's the next move? You will allow no convoys?

Meir: No Convoys.

Kissinger: then if the Soviets fly in helicopters? you shoot them down?

Meir: Maybe.

Kissinger: And if they put in the Soviet Air Force, you'll fight the Soviet Air Force?

Meir: Does this mean that whatever the Egyptians propose we have to accept.

Kissinger: No, but in the context of something reasonable we can do something..... You're refusing even to discuss the October 22 lines..... In other words, Nothing has survived since yesterday.... What you underestimate is the total impossibility in which we won't cooperate of destroying the Third Army.... I think you face a disaster.... The great powers will never allow you to destroy the Third Army.

Read it all in Document No. 93B

source www.gwu.edu

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