The October War and U.S.
Policy
After thirty years, U.S.A.
declassified very secret documents about 6 October war and these documents were
organized chronologically and published by The National Security Archive -
George
Washington University on the net
http://www.gwu.edu .
And here some of the highlights of the declassified archival record from the website and the other highlights from the point of view of Yom Kippur
website.
May 20, 1973. Before war, Egypt
offered peace with Israel
In a meeting between Muhammed Hafez Ismail Egyptian
presidential adviser for national security affairs and
Henry A. Kissinger, Assistant to the president for national security
affairs.
"Muhammed Hafez Ismail: we have gone to accept to enter into a peace
agreement with Israel. This is the first time in almost a quarter of a century
that an Arab Head of State takes a decision to be prepared to enter into a peace
agreement with Israel..... So if this is not the solution that Egypt wants, what
is left for her? to accept status quo? or to go to war?
Henry A. Kissinger: I tried to Explain to you last time what I thought, our
recognition of Egyptian sovereignty, and I assured that Israel would violently,
totally oppose this part."
Read it all in Document No. 2a
The war started on Saturday, 6 of October 1973
The failure of the intelligence
The failure of U.S. intelligence to perceive the imminent threat of war;
according to the State Department's intelligence chief, Ray Cline: "I would
like to make one observation about the intelligence. Our difficulty was partly
that we were brainwashed by the Israelis, who brainwashed themselves."
Read it all in Document No. 63
During the War
Arab will lose in 72 hours
Kissinger think that Arab will lose in 72 hours, in a meeting
between Ambassador Huang Chen PRG Liaison Office and Henry Kissinger on 6th of
October 1973
"Kissinger: The fighting today. For today and tomorrow the Arabs think this
is disadvantageous for them. They think it is asking them to give something up.
By Tuesday and Wednesday if the war isn't ended, the Arabs will be pleading with
us to get this for them, since within 72 to 96 hours the Arabs will be
completely defeated. And we have to think of that situation, not of today's
situation when they have gained a little territory."
Read it all in Document No. 17
Israel about to lose the war
In a meeting between Simcha Dinitz Ambassador of Israel and
Henry Kissinger on 9th of October 1973. Kissinger doesn't believe that Israel about to
lose the war and says
"Kissinger: I don't understand how it could happen. Our strategy was to give you until
Wednesday evening (10/6/1973) by which time I
thought the whole Egyptian army would be wrecked....... we face massive
problems. we expected a quick victory. Our whole strategy was to delay until
Wednesday."
Read it all in Document No. 21A
The Gap, 17th of October 1973
Admiral Thomas Moorer from JCS says his opinion about The Gap on 17th
of October 1973 (I think the canal crossing of those Israeli tanks is nothing
more than a raid on the Egyptian air defenses. I don't think they can survive
long.)
Read it all in Document No. 36A
Israeli violations of the UN cease-fire
22 October 1973, 1:35 - 2:15 p.m.
Kissinger's virtual green light for Israeli violations of the UN
cease-fire and Israel take the advantage to close roads to the Egyptian third army.
In a Meeting between Golda Meir Prime Minster of Israel and Kissinger.
"Kissinger: You won't get violent protests from Washington if something happens
during the night, while I am flying. Nothing can happen in Washington until noon
tomorrow."
Meir: If they don't stop, We won't.
Kissinger: Even if they do...."
Kissinger warns Meir that Israeli forces would collapse, in
the same meeting.
"Kissinger: Gromyko (Minster of foreign affairs of USSR) took
me aside and said the only danger in Egypt is panic, that your force across the
canal isn't very large. This is what they told me. He said that if some
steadiness could be produced, maybe your force would collapse.
Meir: They (the Egyptian forces) didn't collapse. But they're in
disorder. But it is not like 1967."
Read it all in Document No. 54
Israel close roads to The Egyptian Third Army after cease-fire
Thursday - November 1, 1973, 8:10 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.
In a meeting between Kissinger and Meir.
"Kissinger: You took the third army after ceasefire, which was not
expected..... It is an unusual situation where an army is trapped after the
ceasefire went into effect."
Read it all in Document No. 91A
Egypt insist on October 22 lines before Israeli violations and
the final talks which end to a settlement.
Egypt insist that Israel has to return to October 22 lines and
open the roads to the third army according to the Security Council Resolutions,
In a meeting between Ismail Fahmi Acting Egyptian Foreign Minster and
Henry Kissinger.
Thursday - November 1, 1973, 5:30 pm.
"Fahmi: She (Golda Meir) cannot bargain on the return to the
October 22 positions. The Security Council has decided the matter......She
accepted security council resolutions which called for a return to the October
22 positions... If you cannot give me definite answer, does it mean she refused
to return to the October 22 Positions?.. I hope you can settle this whole matter
before you come to Egypt. If not, You cannot accomplish anything."
Read it all in Document No. 92A
In a meeting between Ismail Fahmi Acting Egyptian Foreign
Minster and Henry Kissinger.
Friday - November 2, 1973, 8:19 p.m.
"Fahmi: I heard what you said regarding Israeli
acceptance on October 14 of a ceasefire in place with the United States and the
USSR abstaining. The tragedy is now, I don't see why she (Meir) does not return to
October 22 positions.
Kissinger: There is no rational explanation.
Fahmi: Do they want a settlement ? They will not be able to stay
there. She knows this.
Kissinger: She does not.
Fahmi: How does anyone believe that Sadat (President of Egypt) can go to negotiations if she does not
return to the October 22 Position?"
Read it all in Document No. 92B
In a Meeting between Kissinger, Golda Meir The Prime Minster of
Israel and Mordechai Gazit, Director of Prime Minster's Office.
Thursday, November 1, 1973.
8:10 a.m. - 10:25 a.m.
"Kissinger: It is just as reasonable for you to go back to the October 22
lines.
Gazit: It may sound naive, But it may be useful to emphasize the
importance of the talks going on between the generals.
Kissinger: But if I emphasize it too much, The Egyptians will break them off. I
really must tell you you have no appreciation of the situation you face in the
country. You may appreciate the battlefield situation
Meir: Then if we appreciate the situation, we must accept everything the
Egyptians put to us? It's only the beginning.
Kissinger. No. But you're right, it is only the beginning......You can tell the president
(Nixon) you won't accept the October 22 lines. How
can you explain why you could accept it on October 22 but not now?"
Read it all in Document No. 91A
In a Meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir The Prime Minster of
Israel.
Friday, November 2, 1973.10:00 p.m. - 12:45 a.m.
"Kissinger: Sadat can't make a settlement in which he not only gets nothing on
the East Bank but gives up ten kilometers on the West Bank. He'll be overthrown.
We have a letter from shah (president of Iran) pleading with us not to go to this. He's not your
enemy, and this is what he thinks it means."
Read it all in Document No. 93A
In a Meeting between Kissinger and Golda Meir The Prime Minster of
Israel.
Saturday, November 3, 1973.
"Meir: The Question of October 22 lines will be discussed between the two
sides in the framework of disengagement and separation of forces.
Kissinger: What does that mean?
Meir: It means the generals will touch on it, talk about it.
Kissinger: But if you propose an exchange of armies, What's the significance of
the October 22 lines?
Meir: Right. It has none.
Kissinger: you and we are living in a different world. Suppose we make this
proposal and they reject it, What's the next move? You will allow no convoys?
Meir: No Convoys.
Kissinger: then if the Soviets fly in helicopters? you shoot them down?
Meir: Maybe.
Kissinger: And if they put in the Soviet Air Force, you'll fight the Soviet Air
Force?
Meir: Does this mean that whatever the Egyptians propose we have to accept.
Kissinger: No, but in the context of something reasonable we can do something..... You're refusing even to discuss the
October 22 lines..... In other words, Nothing has survived since yesterday....
What you underestimate is the total impossibility in which we won't cooperate of
destroying the Third Army.... I think you face a disaster.... The great powers will never allow you to destroy the Third Army.
Read it all in Document No. 93B
Source:http://www.gwu.edu/
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