Sharon in 1973 war

 
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Sharon in the first days of the war

Adan, Avraham recalls what Sharon did on 8th October 1973

"Orders to commanders of divisions don't mean that they are not responsible. Sharon as Example was ordered by Gen. Gonen to leave his sector, but he acted strangely, he ordered his commanders of brigades to move to south and not to leave any troops to defend that sector in spite of enemy's activities, his sector was empty and would be easy to occupy by Egyptians, Sharon didn't clear this to Gen. Gonen before leaving his sector.

 The forces have to support other near forces, this is a very important and vital factor to strengthen or weaken forces in the field. But Sharon refused to support my forces with an armored battalion in El-Ferdan and when Gonen ordered him to go back to his sector, he didn't hurry up and back up my forces against enemy, so I failed.

I should mention that there was no cooperate or control among all levels of commanders and it was obvious when Sharon's division returned from south to the middle sector which I left. We didn't know that Sharon came back again, the result, troops of both divisions opened fire on each other, believing that they were opening fire on the enemy."

Source: Adan, Avraham (Bren). On the Banks of the Suez: An Israeli General's Personal Account of the Yom Kippur War (Gamal Hammad, the military historian, in his book "Military Battles on the Egyptian Front" )

Sharonís division did not support either of them.

(We were following Sharonís division. Around noon on 8th Oct. Sharonís division moved towards east of Suez where Mindlerís division was fighting against forces of the 3rd army trying to penetrate them. It was clear that Sharonís division would cooperate with Mindlerís division hoping to achieve the counter-attack after failing to do that towards the 2nd army.

While Sharonís division was moving south towards Suez , Adanís division was losing facing the 2nd army and had to get back to the east to take defensive positions. General Gonen had to get Sharonís division back .

At the end of the fighting, Adanís division was beaten by the 2nd army, and mindlerís division by the 3rd army and Sharonís division did not cooperate with either of them)-Mohammed Abdel Ghany Al Gamsy.

Source: October 1973 war book for Mohammed Abdel Ghany Al Gamsy Chief of operations of Egyptian army during the war.

Sharon in the last days of the war

Sharon failed to occupy Al-Ismailia city

"The second Egyptian army had two brigades of mechanical infantry, brigade number 10 and brigade 118, and a paratroopers brigade number 182 and a group of commanders number 129, almost a whole mixed division, faced Sharon's division, two armored brigades and one paratroopers brigade.

On 20th of October 1973, general Gonen, the Israeli commander of the southern front, informed Sharon that the cease-fire resolution about to be issued. Sharon, the commander of the operations group number 143, started managing his last battle towards Al-Ismailia city. In the early morning, the Israeli aircrafts attacked Al-Ismailia, Port Said and Port Fouad cities focusing on all SAM (surface to air missiles) batteries and anti-aircrafts weapons, also the Egyptian forces in Gala' camp and Maryam Mountain area. The Israeli aircrafts used time and Napalm bombs.

Sharon used all the power and the forces he had, to reach and to cross Al-Ismaillia canal in order to occupy Al-Ismailia and then stopping all major supplies coming from Cairo and east of Delta to the second Egyptian army in the east of the canal.

Sharon was sure that the fall of Al-Ismailia city would be a big international political event, and he might be famous with a high military glory. But his hopes and dreams were broken for two reasons:-
First: the nature of the land of the front.
Second: the tough resistance of the second Egyptian army along Al-Ismailia canal, forced Sharon's division to stop moving and couldn't cross the canal to Al-Ismailia.

At 21/22 night, the artillery commander of the second army General Mohamed Abdel Halim Abu Ghazala opened fire all the night on Sharon's division. In the morning, Israeli aircrafts attacked our forces. It was dark, and cease-fire began on 22 of October, there were a lot of  Israelis wounded at the battlefield, Sharon asked for helicopters to save them, but general Bar-Lev didn't approve his request, because it was dark night and difficult for helicopters to land near the battle. Sharon ordered his men to rely on themselves to save the wounded soldiers. Rescue operation took 4 hours to move all wounded and dead soldiers from the battlefield."

Source: Gamal Hammad, the military historian, in his book "Military Battles on the Egyptian Front".

Comments about Sharon after the war

About crossing to the west of the canal, David Elazar the Israeli chief of staff said on 3rd December 1973 (Sharon still continues his irresponsible declaration to journalists trying to lessen the role of other leaders to appear as an unique champion, although he knows well that our crossing to the western side of the canal caused too much losses. However, we could not, along ten days of fighting, overcome any of Egyptian armies. The second army resisted and prevented us ultimately to reach Al-Ismailia city. As for the third army, in spite of our encircling them, they resisted and advanced to occupy, in fact, a wider area of land at the east. Thus, we can not say that we defeated or conquered them) the Israeli chief of staff - David Elazar.

 

 

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