Al-Sadat ends the services of all Soviet military experts

General Mohamed Abd Al-Ghany Al-Gamasy said in his memoirs ( The soviet policy at that time depended on the refusal of war, their insistence not to supply us by weapons, it was clear that the Soviet Union preferred to us not to begin attack during 1971 till its end.

In the first meeting between Sadat and the Soviet Union Commanders in March 1971 in Moscow, there was difference between the Egyptian and Soviet opinion concerning the issue of armament. According to Sadat narration in the supreme council of the Armed Forces " you (Soviet Union) made me behind Israel by two steps, I am the victim, though, I do not ask to surpass Israel, but I need equality, and here is the difference.".

Although, Soviet Union promises to provide us with weapon before 1971, but they did not send anything, meanwhile Indian battle began on 9th of December 1971."

Al-Sadat said that he called up the Soviet Ambassador and said to him "It is clear, the year of 1971 is over, I told him inform Moscow that I want to visit them to clarify the situation before 1971. They answered me that the meeting will be on 1 and 2 February 1972. Because the Soviet agenda was busy till that date.

1972 had come and It was clear that Israel would not change its political situation till our military forces become able to launch war against it. There was a continuous difference between Egypt and the Soviet Union concerning the issue of armament, the relation between the two countries became very bad in July 1972, when president Sadat decided to dispense with the services of all Soviet military experts.)

Source: October War 1973, second edition 1998. General Mohamed Abd Al-Ghany Al-Gamasy chief of operations of Egyptian Army during the war.

Al-Sadat said in his book "In search of Identity" how he decided to do that:

( The Soviet ambassador suddenly called late in April 1972, to convey an "urgent" message from the Soviet leaders. They wanted me to pay a visit to Moscow. We—the Soviet leaders and I—agreed at our Moscow talks on the need for them to send us a detailed analysis of the situation after [President Richard] Nixon's visit to Moscow in May, preparatory to the shipment to Egypt of all those weapons included in the old contracts. November 1972, when the U.S. presidential campaign would be held, was the agreed deadline. The idea was that we should be adequately prepared by November, when a new American President would have been elected, to resort to military action if all avenues to peace continued to be blocked. They agreed to this and I returned to Cairo.

Nixon made his first visit to the Soviet Union in May 1972 as planned. The first statement on détente was issued jointly by Moscow and Washington, advocating military relaxation in the Middle East. It was a violent shock to us because, as I have previously explained, we lagged at least twenty steps behind Israel and so "military relaxation" in this context could mean nothing but giving in to Israel.

The Soviet "analysis," following from the Moscow Nixon meeting, reached me on July 6, in other words, more than a month late. This analysis explained that no progress had been achieved on the Middle East question in the Soviet-American talks, just as I had predicted during my Moscow visit late in April, in view of the fact that it was the U.S. election year. What was even more odd, the Soviet analysis conveyed to me by the Soviet ambassador said nothing at all about the failure to ship the requested weapons.

I asked the Soviet ambassador: "Is this the message?"
"Yes," he said.
"You were, weren't you, with us in Moscow last April," I said, "and you did hear us agree that the weapons should be sent to us before the U.S. elections took place?"
"Yes," he replied.
"Well," I continued, "this message doesn't mention that."
"This is the message I have received."
"Well," I said, "I cannot accept it, and indeed reject the Soviet leaders' method in dealing with us. Please convey all I am going to tell you to the Soviet leaders as an official message.
"One. I reject this message you've transmitted to me from the Soviet leaders, both in form and content. It is unacceptable. I reject, too, this method in dealing with us.
"Two. I have decided to dispense with the services of all Soviet military experts (about 15,000) and that they must go back to the Soviet Union within one week from today. I shall convey this order to the War Minister." )

source :Book of the late president Mohammed Anwar Al-Sadat "In search of Identity"

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