Al-Sadat ends the services of all Soviet
military experts
General
Mohamed Abd Al-Ghany Al-Gamasy said in his memoirs ( The soviet policy at that time depended on the
refusal of war, their insistence not to supply us by
weapons, it was clear that the
Soviet Union preferred to us not to begin attack
during 1971 till its end.
In the first meeting between Sadat and the Soviet
Union Commanders in March 1971 in Moscow, there was
difference between the Egyptian and Soviet opinion
concerning the issue of armament. According to Sadat
narration in the supreme council of the Armed Forces
" you (Soviet Union) made me behind Israel by two steps, I am the
victim, though, I do not ask to surpass Israel, but I
need equality, and here is the difference.".
Although, Soviet Union promises to provide us with
weapon before 1971, but they did not send anything,
meanwhile Indian battle began on 9th of December
1971."
Al-Sadat said that he called up the Soviet
Ambassador and said to him "It is clear, the year of
1971 is over, I told him inform Moscow that I want
to visit them to clarify the situation before 1971.
They answered me that the meeting will be on 1 and 2
February 1972. Because the Soviet agenda was busy till that date.
1972
had come and It was clear that
Israel would not change its political situation till
our military forces become able to launch war
against it. There was a continuous
difference between Egypt and the Soviet Union
concerning the issue of armament, the relation
between the two countries became very bad in July
1972, when president Sadat decided to
dispense with the services of all Soviet military
experts.)
Source:
October War 1973, second
edition 1998. General Mohamed Abd Al-Ghany Al-Gamasy
chief of operations of
Egyptian Army during the
war.
Al-Sadat said in his book "In search of Identity"
how he decided to do that:
( The Soviet ambassador
suddenly called late in April 1972, to convey an
"urgent" message from the Soviet leaders. They
wanted me to pay a visit to Moscow. We—the Soviet
leaders and I—agreed at our Moscow talks on the need
for them to send us a detailed analysis of the
situation after [President Richard] Nixon's visit to
Moscow in May, preparatory to the shipment to Egypt
of all those weapons included in the old contracts.
November 1972, when the U.S. presidential campaign
would be held, was the agreed deadline. The idea was
that we should be adequately prepared by November,
when a new American President would have been
elected, to resort to military action if all avenues
to peace continued to be blocked. They agreed to
this and I returned to Cairo.
Nixon made his first visit to the Soviet Union in
May 1972 as planned. The first statement on détente
was issued jointly by Moscow and Washington,
advocating military relaxation in the Middle East.
It was a violent shock to us because, as I have
previously explained, we lagged at least twenty
steps behind Israel and so "military relaxation" in
this context could mean nothing but giving in to
Israel.
The
Soviet "analysis," following from the Moscow Nixon
meeting, reached me on July 6, in other words, more
than a month late. This analysis explained that no
progress had been achieved on the Middle East
question in the Soviet-American talks, just as I had
predicted during my Moscow visit late in April, in
view of the fact that it was the U.S. election year.
What was even more odd, the Soviet analysis conveyed
to me by the Soviet ambassador said nothing at all
about the failure to ship the requested weapons.
I
asked the Soviet ambassador: "Is this the message?"
"Yes," he said.
"You were, weren't you, with us in Moscow last
April," I said, "and you did hear us agree that the
weapons should be sent to us before the U.S.
elections took place?"
"Yes," he replied.
"Well," I continued, "this message doesn't mention
that."
"This is the message I have received."
"Well," I said, "I cannot accept it, and indeed
reject the Soviet leaders' method in dealing with
us. Please convey all I am going to tell you to the
Soviet leaders as an official message.
"One. I reject this message you've transmitted to me
from the Soviet leaders, both in form and content.
It is unacceptable. I reject, too, this method in
dealing with us.
"Two. I have decided to dispense with the services
of all Soviet military experts (about 15,000) and
that they must go back to the Soviet Union within
one week from today. I shall convey this order to
the War Minister." )
Source:
Book of the late president Mohammed Anwar Al-Sadat
"In search of Identity"
